Sanitation as Opportunity: Looking at Nairobi

In light of my previous discussions of target failures, the importance of contextualising approaches and the specific demands of the urban, this post will examine the feasibility of sanitation as a profit making enterprise.

Participation of the private sector in sanitation and water provision is not a new idea. Indeed, it came part and parcel with the widespread Thatcher/Reagan led privatisation in the 1980s and early 1990s. That being said, it is generally considered that widespread neoliberal policies have failed to achieve the desired results regarding water and sanitation services (WSS) (Castro, 2005:757). Instead of cheaper provision from greater efficiency, widening inequality characterised WSS in developing countries by a strengthening of existing power asymmetries and a further deepening of societal alienation (Castro, 2005:757). The experiences of Latin America are a particular testament to this. Nevertheless, the immense potential of the private sector as a development actor cannot be ignored. More recent attempts at integration have emphasised the scale of private projects and the importance of collaborative partnerships. Indeed, the tri-partite alliance of government, private sector and community has been stressed as a way of channelling private power though democratic frameworks (Carter & Danert,2003:1069). That said, it is difficult not to remain sceptical of the private sector as a true development actor. It must be remembered that the overarching priority for any firm is profit. Any other objective will always stand secondary. Even a firm founded upon the most egalitarian principles of human betterment will inevitably be forced into actions that prioritise shareholders over benevolence. Yet, this is trait similar to those shared by other development actors. Government must answer to its political subjects, NGOs to their donors and academics to peer approvals (Carter & Danert, 2003:1070). Perhaps in this regard, private organisations are dissimilar in their contingent agency. Instead then we should embrace the innate cynicism of business to ask - how can the demands of commerce be aligned with the needs of the global South? How can we make development profitable?

The example of Community Cleaning Services (CCS) in Nairobi shows promise by employing some of the ideas of place, scale & collaboration in a ‘bottom of the pyramid’ approach to sanitation provision:

Improvised toilet in Mathare, Nairobi. Source: Baraka Mwau.

CCS was a micro-franchise toilet cleaning business, set up in 2005, to provide an entrepreneurial sanitation platform to people of the Mathare slum district of Nairobi (Thieme, 2013). The platform received funding through the American franchisee SC Johnson in Wisconsin. CCS employed local youth groups, organised into teams of 6-12 members and working from a central office or ‘base’. The teams operated independently but each would receive their own training, uniforms and equipment. The foremost day-to-day business of each team was cleaning toilets, for which they would be paid between 250 and 350KSh ($3-4) for each job, of which a good day would constitute four to six (2013:232). The team would work only within Mathare and would serve both community and shared private facilities.

CCS was unique in the manner to which it became embedded within the Taki Ni Pato (trash is cash) informal youth networks of the slum. Part of this was recognising that toilet cleaning formed only a small aspect of a diverse portfolio of activities that employees would take part in. Thieme (2013) refers to this as the ‘hustle’ economy, stylizing the idea that employment in informal settlements is often characterised by a ‘graft mentality’ where work is picked up here and there, inherently flexible. It reflects the dynamic and changeable nature of life in the Mathare whereby it can be unwise to depend upon only a single stream of income. As a result, CCS workers would also take part in activities such as waste collection, recycling and car washing.

Sadly, after a promising run of seven years, CCS closed in 2013. Ultimately, this was down to a lack of profitability. Struggles to scale the business and meet wider corporate demands left SC Johnson little choice but to end the funding (2013:237). Nevertheless, despite the perceived business failure, CCS still stands as a relative development success. For seven years it provided a part of Nairobi failed by government, a vital sanitation service with modest profit. It invigorated a change in behaviour by way of ‘normalising the monetization of cleaning services and human waste disposal’ (2013:236) to demonstrate that sanitation business opportunities do exist. By way of its integrated grassroots approach of youth and hustle, CCS provided a promising bridge between international private power and urban African customers. Whilst profit margins were insufficient for the business requirements of SC Johnson alone, perhaps further collaboration between city government and NGOs could have enhanced its long-term sustainability. 

To read further I recommend taking a look at the Toilet Board Coalitions report on the‘Sanitation Economy’ – a really interesting document with some insightful graphics on varying modes of business.