The future of water & sanitation in Africa

Throughout this blog I have tried to demonstrate that although closely linked, sanitation and water are inherently different. Indeed, contrary to my own original belief, it is erroneous to assume that adequate sanitation will come freely with sufficient water. Sanitation is a learned practice whose subjectivities must be understood before improvements realised. To do this requires a push in awareness of sanitation as a fundamental pre-requisite to further development in Africa. This thinking must be adopted by policy makers to avoid the trappings of previous failures. Greater international recognition does show promise of a shifting paradigm but more must still be done to engage with a wider audience.

In terms of application, the theme throughout has been the need for more contextualised, place specific approaches. Adopting ideas of ‘appropriate technology’ will help to stress the importance of the small-scale as providing a necessary platform of participation and inclusion required for long-term success (Schumacher,1973; Solo, 1999). This is especially pertinent to the involvement of women, whose unique and habitually leading engagement in both water and sanitation access has often been overlooked by large-scale top-down approaches (O’Reilly, 2010).

Bottom-up community & business-led water & sanitation schemes have shown promise but, as examples in Nairobi and Uchira have shown, they are no panacea and these approaches almost always require overarching support. Thus, the facilitative role of the state and NGOs is critical. Collaboration is necessary but finding the correct ‘formula’ of actors can be challenging (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). It is likely this will be contingent on specific geographies of space such as the rural/urban divide of which I have posted. Yet, it is important to note that the complexity of issues makes it impossible to justify definitive quick-fix ‘reductionist’ claims for what works and where. Indeed, the embedded and personal nature of water & sanitation behaviour must be recognised as being somewhat stubborn in its capacity for adjustment. Thus, change will come but cannot be expected instantaneously.

In conclusion, the ultimate remedy to poor water & sanitation provision in sub-Saharan Africa is one of public determination. Recognition of ‘equal right between those in the mainstream and those in the margins’ is required to enact meaningful change (Amin, 2006:1015). This is relevant for public sector influence but also for private sector mobilisation. Indeed, much of the limits of business as a development actor lie not within normative business practices themselves but in the expectations of the individual. Water and sanitation provision can more easily be made profitable if development practices are accepted into the expectations of consumers. For example, patrons must be willing to pay more for their goods if development orientated business investments are to be sustained. Perhaps, through receipt of this can the vast potential of the most powerful development force be fully utilised. 

‘Own key’ Arrangements for water & sanitation: Looking at Uchira, Tanzania

A widespread remedy to the historical pitfalls of water & sanitation provision and the ensuing call for contextualised approaches has been community management or ‘own key’ arrangements (Drangert et al. 2002:354). This approach has been particularly emphasised within wider ‘grassroots development’ narratives since the late 1990s but has roots in colonial development practice (see British propaganda film Daybreak inUdi, 1949). It is particularly advocated in rural settings, where state or private involvement might be especially lacking. For this reason, it has become the preferred policy across much of rural sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The basic principles of operation conclude that the best manner of provision is one in which the community has a principle role not only as project consultants, but also as long-term managers (Harvey & Reed, 2006:365). That being said, the sustainability of such applications remains woefully inadequate with estimates suggesting that up to 35% of rural water systems in SSA are defective (2006:366). Specific reasons for these failures are plentiful but typically centre around issues of motivation, training and maintenance costs (Carter et al. 1999:294). A common problem is that rural communities are unable to afford the initial investment to construct such infrastructure. Thus, they are often supported through one-time government or NGO funding but are henceforth expected to bear any maintenance costs themselves. However, once donors move on, many communities struggle without adequate management training and a dedicated maintenance budget. These issues are often intensified by problems of motivation. As I have previously mentioned, this is particularly pertinent for sanitation. If people do not recognise a need for facilities then how can they be expected to use them? Never mind paying to have them repaired. Issues such as these also stem from a perceived lack of ownership. Communities are unwilling to step in to manage or repair systems that have been built by others – they feel it is not their responsibility. Thus, management schemes try to overcome this by actively engaging the community in initial construction – either through physical labour or financial payment. The thinking being that communities will work harder to maintain something they have built themselves and perceive as theirs.

Thus, it is clear that community managed water & sanitation schemes are susceptible to a variety of difficulties and can be challenging to get right. The remainder of this post will examine the case of Uchira village in Tanzania:

Location of Uchira village. Source GoogleMaps.

The village of Uchira is situated in North-Eastern Tanzania, close to Mt Kilimanjaro and the border with Kenya. The majority of residents are subsistence farmers who depend upon cattle raising and rain-fed agriculture (Cleaver & Toner, 2006:211). In the face of an insufficient state run water supply, the Uchira Water Use Association (UWUA) was set up in 2001, with funding from the German NGO, GTZ. The water project involved repairing existing gravity fed pipes, installing taps and the construction of an office building. This was done with labour and resource contributions from the villagers themselves (2006:211). The system is managed by the UWUA, staffed by professionals and with a board made up of villagers who have paid the necessary membership charge. Non-members are not able to participate in management decisions but are able to purchase water for a small fee. There is a 50:50 gender requirement for UWUA representatives that appears to have been observed (2006:213).

In general, villagers of Uchira are happier under the community-managed system (Ibid). Indeed, the now year-round water availability has exemplified the village as a success to be replicated. That said, Uchira has suffered from tension regarding disagreements amongst community members. Despite construction involvement, full community participation has been lacking due in part to lack of interest and part to the membership charge. Taking management authority takes time and money – something that the poorer residents of the village are not able to give. Thus, they are priced out of the decision making process. Issues of water tariffs further exacerbate problems, with some villagers refusing to pay for something they consider as rightfully theirs. Without enforcement capacity, it has been difficult for UWUA to deal with this and some villagers tend to pay more than others.

The case of Uchira illustrates the difficulty of evaluating multiple outcomes of community based water management (2006, 216). Altogether, the project was successful; yet, some community members have been empowered at the expense of others. This highlights that community management schemes are particularly susceptible to stagnation through traditional asymmetries of societal power. Here it has been economic power but others also fall foul on axis of age, religion and particularly gender. In its 50:50 pledge, UWUA was commendable but too often women are overlooked in decision-making processes.

To read further I recommend taking a look at the ‘Myths of the rural supply sector’ by the RWSN.

Sanitation as Opportunity: Looking at Nairobi

In light of my previous discussions of target failures, the importance of contextualising approaches and the specific demands of the urban, this post will examine the feasibility of sanitation as a profit making enterprise.

Participation of the private sector in sanitation and water provision is not a new idea. Indeed, it came part and parcel with the widespread Thatcher/Reagan led privatisation in the 1980s and early 1990s. That being said, it is generally considered that widespread neoliberal policies have failed to achieve the desired results regarding water and sanitation services (WSS) (Castro, 2005:757). Instead of cheaper provision from greater efficiency, widening inequality characterised WSS in developing countries by a strengthening of existing power asymmetries and a further deepening of societal alienation (Castro, 2005:757). The experiences of Latin America are a particular testament to this. Nevertheless, the immense potential of the private sector as a development actor cannot be ignored. More recent attempts at integration have emphasised the scale of private projects and the importance of collaborative partnerships. Indeed, the tri-partite alliance of government, private sector and community has been stressed as a way of channelling private power though democratic frameworks (Carter & Danert,2003:1069). That said, it is difficult not to remain sceptical of the private sector as a true development actor. It must be remembered that the overarching priority for any firm is profit. Any other objective will always stand secondary. Even a firm founded upon the most egalitarian principles of human betterment will inevitably be forced into actions that prioritise shareholders over benevolence. Yet, this is trait similar to those shared by other development actors. Government must answer to its political subjects, NGOs to their donors and academics to peer approvals (Carter & Danert, 2003:1070). Perhaps in this regard, private organisations are dissimilar in their contingent agency. Instead then we should embrace the innate cynicism of business to ask - how can the demands of commerce be aligned with the needs of the global South? How can we make development profitable?

The example of Community Cleaning Services (CCS) in Nairobi shows promise by employing some of the ideas of place, scale & collaboration in a ‘bottom of the pyramid’ approach to sanitation provision:

Improvised toilet in Mathare, Nairobi. Source: Baraka Mwau.

CCS was a micro-franchise toilet cleaning business, set up in 2005, to provide an entrepreneurial sanitation platform to people of the Mathare slum district of Nairobi (Thieme, 2013). The platform received funding through the American franchisee SC Johnson in Wisconsin. CCS employed local youth groups, organised into teams of 6-12 members and working from a central office or ‘base’. The teams operated independently but each would receive their own training, uniforms and equipment. The foremost day-to-day business of each team was cleaning toilets, for which they would be paid between 250 and 350KSh ($3-4) for each job, of which a good day would constitute four to six (2013:232). The team would work only within Mathare and would serve both community and shared private facilities.

CCS was unique in the manner to which it became embedded within the Taki Ni Pato (trash is cash) informal youth networks of the slum. Part of this was recognising that toilet cleaning formed only a small aspect of a diverse portfolio of activities that employees would take part in. Thieme (2013) refers to this as the ‘hustle’ economy, stylizing the idea that employment in informal settlements is often characterised by a ‘graft mentality’ where work is picked up here and there, inherently flexible. It reflects the dynamic and changeable nature of life in the Mathare whereby it can be unwise to depend upon only a single stream of income. As a result, CCS workers would also take part in activities such as waste collection, recycling and car washing.

Sadly, after a promising run of seven years, CCS closed in 2013. Ultimately, this was down to a lack of profitability. Struggles to scale the business and meet wider corporate demands left SC Johnson little choice but to end the funding (2013:237). Nevertheless, despite the perceived business failure, CCS still stands as a relative development success. For seven years it provided a part of Nairobi failed by government, a vital sanitation service with modest profit. It invigorated a change in behaviour by way of ‘normalising the monetization of cleaning services and human waste disposal’ (2013:236) to demonstrate that sanitation business opportunities do exist. By way of its integrated grassroots approach of youth and hustle, CCS provided a promising bridge between international private power and urban African customers. Whilst profit margins were insufficient for the business requirements of SC Johnson alone, perhaps further collaboration between city government and NGOs could have enhanced its long-term sustainability. 

To read further I recommend taking a look at the Toilet Board Coalitions report on the‘Sanitation Economy’ – a really interesting document with some insightful graphics on varying modes of business.